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Big Latin American 
industrial companies 
and groups 
This article seeks to summarize the results of some studies on 
the structure and dynamics of the big domestically owned 
industrial companies and groups in five Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) and 
presente supplementary elements for placing them in an overall 
perspective. The studies include individual analyses of 46 
leading companies (in Brazil, Chile and Colombia) and 15 
economic groups with an industrial base (in Brazil and 
Mexico), together with aggregated studies of such groups in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. In all cases, the studies were 
based on specially arranged interviews, the review of statistical 
and documentary information, and data already processed in the 
relevant literature. The time-scale of the studies ranges from the 
formation of some big companies and groups in the early years 
of the century or the period of dynamic import substitution 
industrialization, up to the changes under way in the second 
half of the 1990s. Analysis is centered on the last decade: i.e., 
since the time when the structural reform processes were at 
their height in most of the countries whose big companies and 
groups are studied in this work. The article is divided into four 
sections. After the Introduction (seetion I), some summary 
details of the business context in the five countries studied are 
given (section II), after which the main structural features of the 
big companies and groups and their recent dynamics at the 
company, plant and group level are analysed (section III). 
Finally, in section IV, the main challenges facing public policies 
in this respect and the positions taken in the current debate on 
them are set forth. 
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I 
Introduction 
In the second half of the 1990s, the big privately 
owned industrial companies and groups (BIGS) oc-
cupy a strong position in the markets of the Latin 
American countries. This position is the result of 
processes which took place in the context of the 
structural changes undergone at the national and in-
ternational level since the early 1980s and has meant 
that the BiGs, along with the subsidiaries of transna-
tional corporations, are now the biggest and most dy-
namic business units operating in Latin American 
industry. This dominant position has tended to be fur-
ther strengthened by the privatization of the great ma-
jority of State-owned industrial enterprises, while 
smaller enterprises continue to face problems in 
modernizing their operations and speeding up their 
growth. 
In terms of their competitiveness, the BiGs are in 
a transitional position, and in spite of their strength 
they are facing threats due to their structural charac-
teristics, especially the fact that they are smaller than 
their international competitors and are located in sec-
tors which are technologically mature and are grow-
ing relatively less rapidly in the world market. The 
growth rates of the BiGs have had difficulty in carry-
ing forward the rest of the domestic economy with 
them, so that it is hard to describe their competitive 
position as reflecting a situation of real leadership. 
Although generally speaking the performance of the 
BiGs is successful, the rest of the local private compa-
nies are going through serious problems in most of 
the countries of the region, while the new configura-
O Ludovico Alcorta, Martine Dirven, Jorge Katz, Joseph Ramos 
and Ana San Sebastián made valuable comments and sugges-
tions which permitted the correction of various errors and incon-
sistencies. This article is a summary version of chapter 1 of 
Peres (1998). 
' The country studies are given in Peres (1998). In order to avoid 
repetition, whenever any of these five countries is mentioned this 
is understood to refer to the corresponding chapter in that book, 
unless otherwise stated. 
tions of the economy generated by the structural re-
forms are still in a state of flux and, in many cases, 
are strongly dependent on external variables. 
The relative fragility and weak leadership capac-
ity of the BiGs raise many doubts and give rise to 
much discussion with regard to their nature and their 
potential in relation to the economies where they op-1 
erate. Most of the studies on the effects of the struc-
tural reforms have concentrated on the macro-
economic dimension, but few of them have analysed 
the situation of enterprises, and especially the BiGs, in 
this process. This omission is paradoxical, because 
in line with the policy approach which has pre-
dominated in the reforms, it might be expected that 
there would be growing interest in analysing the 
strategies and performance of enterprises,' since it 
was expected that these would be the main eco-
nomic agent in the context arising out of the re-
forms. Thus, the studies have not dealt with the 
determinants and forms of the processes of change 
among enterprises, other than noting the positive 
role which it was (rightly) expected that the in-
crease in competition would play. 
This article summarizes the results of several 
studies on the structure and dynamics of BiGs in five 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico).1 These studies include indi-
vidual analyses of 46 leading companies (in Brazil, 
Chile and Colombia) and 15 industrial groups (in 
Brazil and Mexico), together with aggregate analyses 
of such groups in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.2 
2
 The criteria followed in selecting the companies and groups 
studied are described in detail in the corresponding chapters of 
Peres (1998). In most cases, the criteria were based on the pos-
sibility of having access to information and expert opinions on 
the importance of the companies and groups in question. The 
way the study was designed tended to concentrate attention on 
the BIGs which existed at the end of the period studied, which 
really means that the study covers the BIGs which were at least 
partly successful in adjusting to the new economic context. 
The fact that very few BIGs have gone out of business through 
bankruptcy or liquidation means that this skew is not important, 
however. 
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II 
The business context 
Up to the early 1980s, the linkages of the Latin 
American companies and economies with the outside 
world were determined by the conditions established 
under the economic order that arose after the war. 
This order was marked by heavy protectionism and 
the leading role played by the State in organizing and 
regulating economic growth through its promotion of 
import substitution industrialization. 
In the course of their development, the econo-
mies of the region gradually began to display grow-
ing internal and external imbalances which led to 
"stop and go" economic growth. In this context, the 
biggest local enterprises sought a form of growth 
which was in keeping with the particular conditions 
imposed on them by the macroeconomic environ-
ment, the regressive income distribution, and the pre-
dominant orientation of their production towards 
relatively small domestic markets with low quality 
requirements. In particular, the relative smailness of 
the markets soon imposed a limit on their growth 
unless they diversified, and at the same time the pos-
sibility of high rates of profitability in new sectors 
promoted by the import substitution industrialization 
policy made it extremely attractive for them to ven-
ture outside their sectors of origin. 
Thus, the big enterprises used vertical integration 
and the establishment of conglomerates as growth 
strategies, leading to the diversification of their in-
vestments into different economic sectors, including 
banking, against a background of growing concentra-
tion of State support and economic power in their 
favour. Vertical integration enabled them to cope with 
the problems of non-existent or incomplete markets, 
especially with regard to suppliers and subcontract-
ing, which were particularly serious problems in un-
der-developed countries closed to external supply. 
The incorporation of financial activities, for its part, 
enabled them to overcome problems of asymmetrical 
information and gain privileged access to credit, es-
pecially long-term credit. 
Vertical integration and the formation of con-
glomerates made possible the establishment of large 
groups of enterprises (BIGS)3 able to develop and use 
specific assets (such as specialized labour) within 
their operations, reduce transaction costs, diversify 
the risks deriving from the uncertainty caused by eco-
nomic instability, and provide the necessary guaran-
tees when they needed financing on market terms. 
The utilization of economies of scale and of scope or 
field in respect of indivisible assets such as manage-
ment capacity, corporate functions and specialized 
technology kept the advantages of their large scale 
alive even when markets were becoming deeper and 
their flaws were being reduced (Paredes and Sánchez, 
1996). 
The combination of the above elements explains 
why in Latin America, as in other late-developing 
regions, diversification has been an important strat-
egy for maintaining and increasing the size of groups 
of enterprises (Bisang, 1996). However, growth based 
on vertical integration and conglomeration eventually 
came up against the limits imposed by the size of the 
domestic market and led to an extremely vulnerable1 
type of diversification of investments.4 
BlGs were thus the most advanced achievement 
bequeathed by import substitution industrialization in 
the area of domestic private enterprises and, together 
with the subsidiaries of transnational corporations 
and the big State enterprises, they formed the core of 
an industrial structure oriented towards the domestic 
3
 The concept of "economic group" implies a set of operationally 
independent enterprises coordinated by a central body. Its activi-
ties may be concentrated on a certain type of product, diversified 
throughout a production chain with vertical integration, or or-
ganized in conglomerates operating in various sectors of eco-
nomic activity. Very often, these forms of organization include 
financial institutions which, in some cases, are the dominant 
body in determining the common objectives. For a review of the 
theories on economic groups, see Granovetter (1994) and Bisang 
(1996). 
4
 In spite of its costs in terms of specialization, the formation of 
conglomerates still has a role to play in Latin America, as is 
shown by the fact that, in contrast with the trend in developed 
countries, the shares of conglomerates in the region are quoted at 
a premium over those of independent enterprises. Because of 
their lower capital costs and their greater access to the supply of 
management talent, conglomerates are considered to be in a 
better position to take advantage of new business opportunities. 
In particular, foreign investors seem to view conglomerates as 
country funds in which their diversification offers advantages in 
markets which are still of high risk (The Economist, 1997). 
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market. Outside this dominant set of enterprises, 
there was a large number of small enterprises produc-
ing goods of very low technological content and 
making a very limited contribution to the national 
product, their main economic contribution being the 
significant number of jobs they generated. 
In the 1980s, the Latin American economies 
reached such levels of imbalances in their production 
and financial activities that they were faced with the 
need to make structural reforms, seeking new growth 
paths through new types of linkages with the chang-
ing international scene. In general, the structural re-
forms tended to establish new orders marked by 
deregulation and liberalization of markets and open-
ing up of the economy to the exterior. Consequently, 
in these countries there were changes not only in 
the characteristics and forms of macroeconomic op-
III 
It is hard to draw general conclusions from the results 
obtained in the studies on the BIGS of the five Latin 
American countries in question, both because of the 
different backgrounds and forms of evolution of the 
enterprises and the differences between the industries 
in which they operate, and because of the dissimilari-
ties between the countries concerned with regard to 
their institutional and political evolution, size, geo-
graphical location and importance in the region. 
Bearing these limitations in mind, the similari-
ties and differences between the conditions, evolu-
tion and tendencies of the BIGS within the context of 
the two main dimensions of the analysis will be ex-
plored below. In the first section, a profile of their 
characteristics will be drawn on the basis of five vari-
ables: their origin, the predominant type of owner-
ship, their relative size compared with other big 
industrial enterprises, the sectors of activity in which 
they operate, and the relations they have established 
between their domestic market and the international 
economy. In the second section, an analysis will be 
made of their processes of change, which means giv-
ing a schematic description of some of the main inter-
actions between business strategies, the evolution of 
production patterns, and public policy actions, in 
which the impacts and challenges of external open-
eration but also in the production structures and the 
relations of the various economic actors, both with 
each other and with the actors in other countries and 
the world economy as a whole. 
In this context, private enterprises came to be the 
decisive actors in economic growth. Now, more than 
15 years after the beginning of the structural reforms, 
the BlGs continue to be of decisive importance in 
the economies of the countries of the region. Most 
of them occupy outstanding positions in the busi-
ness universe of their countries, although the macro-
economic and institutional context is substantially 
different from that which existed when they were 
originally formed and they are very different, in 
terms of their organizational structures, strategies and 
types of performance, from those which existed in the 
early 1980s. 
ness, globalization and regional integration occupy a 
leading place. 
1. Profile of the big groups and enterprises 
a) Origin 
The BlGs which currently occupy a leading place 
in the Latin American business universe were mostly 
formed during the import substitution industrializa-
tion period, although some of them go back to the 
turn of the century, when the industrialization of the 
most advanced countries of the region began (Bunge 
y Born in Argentina, Alpargatas in Argentina and 
Brazil, the core of the Monterrey group in Mexico, 
Bavaria in Colombia, and Compañía de Cervecerías 
Unidas in Chile, among others). Their origin or rapid 
development during the import substitution industri-
alization period are particularly noteworthy in the 
case of the largest BlGs, which already occupied by 
the late 1970s a position as important as that which 
they occupy today (for example, Votorantim in Bra-
zil, ACINDAR in Argentina or Compañía de Acero del 
Pacífico in Chile), although all of them have had to 
carry out profound restructuring processes in order to 
maintain their position. 
The origin of the main BlGs has been due funda-
mentally to three rationales. The two most important 
Business structure and dynamics 
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of these have been expansion from a strong business 
base developed around natural resources (for exam-
ple, Bunge y Born developed from the marketing of 
cereals to the food industry) and growth through di-
versification in order to generate synergies from a 
basically industrial core (for example, the Monterrey 
group progressed from beer production to the produc-
tion of glass bottles, metal sheets and corrugated 
cardboard). A third rationale, which is less frequent, 
corresponded to cases where the conglomeration was 
promoted by groups with a fundamentally financial 
base or connected ' with civil engineering or other 
services, which tended to acquire existing enterprises 
rather than creating new activities. Some outstanding 
examples of this are the groups generated around the 
Bradesco, Bamerindus, Garantía and Itaú banks and 
the Camargo Correa and Odebrecht construction en-
terprises in Brazil, or the industrial and financial 
groups reconstituted de facto in Mexico after the pri-
vatization of the commercial banking system in the 
early 1990s.5 
In addition to the BiGs which arose before and 
during the import substitution industrialization proc-
ess, there are new and sometimes very powerful BIGS 
which arose or developed in the course of the structural 
reforms carried out from the 1980s onwards. These 
new organizations have arisen from the privatization 
of traditional activities (ENERSIS in Chile) or from 
dynamic processes of conglomeration-building based 
on portfolio criteria (the Carso group in Mexico). 
In the five countries studied, the top businesses 
in the second half of the 1990s were not always the 
same as those of three decades earlier. The emer-
gence of new BIGs and the disappearance or with-
drawal from the group of leading enterprises of a few 
traditional groups such as Matarazzo in Brazil, Di 
Telia in Argentina, Cruzat-Larrain and Vial in Chile 
and the Gran Colombiano group in Colombia6 show 
that the composition of this group of top enterprises 
is not rigid. This suggests that there are different ca-
pacities of reaction to economic and political changes 
5
 By the late 1970s important groups had been set up around the 
Banco Nacional de México (BANAMEX) and the Banco de 
Comercio (BANCOMER), but these disintegrated when the pri-
vate banking system was nationalized in 1982. 
6
 There have been various different causes for the disappearance 
of these groups. Matarazzo began to lose weight from the early 
1960s onwards because it could not cope with the increased com-
petition with its over-diversified and excessively vertically inte-
grated structure. The crisis of Di Telia came on at the end of that 
decade when it could not cope with its problems of excessive 
and that there is competition between capital blocs, 
in contradiction of the apparent "easy-going life of 
the oligopoly" which might be expected to exist in 
captive markets. 
b) Type of ownership 
Both the new BIGs and the traditional ones gen-
erally remain under personal or family ownership 
and are structured within formal or informal eco-
nomic groups, from which they organize their rela-
tions of ownership, control, financing and resource 
allocation. The main reasons for this preference for 
keeping BIGs under personal or family control would 
appear to be the greater flexibility this provides for 
decision-making in unstable contexts, the greater fa-
cility for settling inheritance disputes when the 
founder dies, and the existence of a legal framework 
which does not effectively guarantee the rights of 
minority shareholders and gives rise to some uncer-
tainty about respect for contracts {The Economist, 
1997). Apart from these reasons, however, the pre-
dominance of family ownership and control seems to 
be typical of countries with levels of development 
like those of Latin America, and this becomes clear 
when it is noted that a similar phenomenon is ob-
served in the economies of Southeast Asia (Koike, 
1993). Many BIGs continue to be closed companies, 
in the sense that their shares are not quoted on the 
stock market. Even when they are quoted, these en-
terprises only place a small percentage of their total 
equity on those markets, and the same is true of the 
increasingly numerous enterprises which place 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on the United 
States stock markets. Generally speaking, these enter-
prises have been obliged to improve their provision 
of information, and some of them have had to dis-
member parts of their conglomerates into relatively 
independent corporations, although this has not fun-
damentally changed their forms of ownership and 
control. 
diversification, inefficient scale, and insufficient cash flows for 
dealing with the modernization processes made necessary by 
competition (Bisang, Burachik and Katz (eds.), 1995). Cruzat-
Larrain and Vial went bankrupt in 1983 when, because of the 
devaluation of the Chilean peso and the recession, their enter-
prises could not pay off the loans that their own banks had made 
to them with funds borrowed abroad. Finally, the Gran Colom-
biano group came to an and when the government decided to 
nationalize its controlling body, the Banco de Colombia, in 1984 
because of some dubious transactions (Arbelaez, 1997). 
BIG UTIN AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES AND GROUPS • CELSO GARRIDO AND WILSON PERES 
134 C E P A L R E V I E W 1 6 • A U Q U S T 1 9 9 S 
In some countries, such as Colombia, their reluc-
tance to open up the ownership of their equity seems 
to have impeded the possibility of forming strategic 
associations with foreign investors, with consequent 
negative effects with regard to the transfer of produc-
tion and management know-how. At the other ex-
treme are Argentina and Mexico, where the number 
of such associations has increased markedly in the 
1990s. The results of this have not been fully evalu-
ated, but it would appear that in some cases the asso-
ciations have only lasted a short time or have merely 
foreshadowed the acquisition of a substantial part of 
the local enterprise by the foreign partner, as in the 
case of the purchase of Cervecería Modelo (Mexico) 
by Anheuser Busch. 
c) Relative size 
The question of the size of BIGS and their relative 
position with respect to foreign corporations calls for 
a disaggregated study comparing what has happened 
in the five countries studied. For this purpose, infor-
mation was used from three samples of the hundred 
largest domestic and foreign industrial enterprises in 
Latin America,7 with data for 1990, 1994 and 1996, 
respectively. Each of these samples was taken from a 
broader sample covering the 500 largest industrial 
and non-industrial enterprises of the region, publish-
ed annually by the review América Economía.6 As 
noted in chapter 1 of Peres (1998), in 1996 the hundred 
largest industrial enterprises registered joint sales of 
US$ 163.8 billion, equivalent to 29% of the sales of 
the 500 largest enterprises (US$ 568 billion). The 
economic importance of the big enterprises is obvi-
ous when it is considered that the GDP of the region in 
that year was approximately US$ 1700 billion.9 
If we aggregate the information in the sample in 
question by country and type of ownership, we see 
that 99 of the 100 largest industrial enterprises in the 
region are privately owned (table 1), the Corporación 
In the samples, the definition of ownership used was based on 
the criterion of the majority shareholder at the end of the calen-
dar year. 
8
 For some countries, especially Mexico, the sample includes 
both enterprises and groups of enterprises (holdings). As this 
procedure is not followed for all the countries, it would be 
wrong to claim that the unit of analysis in the tables in this 
article is the BIG, although a number of them (especially those 
in Mexico) are indeed included. It should also be noted that the 
enterprises included in the samples vary from year to year, de-
pending on their interest in participating. 
Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) being the only State-
owned enterprise registered. The numerical balance 
between domestic and foreign-owned private indus-
trial enterprises is also noteworthy, but this conclu-
sion must be subject to reservations in the light of the 
structure of sales in the sample (table 2). 
Thus, whereas domestically-owned private en-
terprises accounted for 40.2% of total sales in 1996, 
the share of foreign-owned enterprises was substan-
tially greater (57.3%), while the presence of State-
owned enterprises was very small (2.5%).10 A 
noteworthy feature in this picture is also the large 
average size of the enterprises concerned. In 1996, 
the average domestic enterprise in the sample had 
sales of US$ 1345 million, while the foreign-owned 
enterprises averaged US$ 1879 million. Naturally, these 
data do not reflect the economic power of each of 
these groups. Although the size of the domestic enter-
prises may be underestimated because not all the en-
terprises of the groups to which they belong are taken 
into account, the great majority of the big foreign 
firms in the region are subsidiaries of giant world 
corporations. 
At the individual country level, there are various 
different situations. Brazil and Mexico account for 
75% of the big industrial enterprises of the region, 
with Brazil having the larger share. As regards the 
balance between domestic and foreign-owned private 
firms, the latter predominate in Brazil, while in 
Mexico, Argentina and Colombia there are different 
degrees of relative balance between the two types of 
firms and in Chile there are only domestic large pri-
vate enterprises. 
In order to complete our consideration of the 
scale of the big Latin American industrial enterprises, 
it is worth comparing them with the big international 
9
 Some reservations should be made regarding the significance 
of sales as an indicator of the size of enterprises. Firstly, these 
amounts may be overvalued because of the level of the real 
exchange rate prevailing in the region. Secondly, these values 
underestimate the importance of domestic private enterprises be-
cause they do not include all the economic groups in which these 
are organized. Thirdly, insofar as the sample includes holdings 
(almost all of them Mexican), there is a risk of duplication. 
Since it is not possible to estimate the sign of the negative effect 
of these three skews, the data in the tables derived from the 
samples should be viewed with caution and taken as merely 
indicative, 
10
 By way of comparison, it is worth noting that in 1996, among 
the 500 biggest enterprises in all sectors of activity, 276 domes-
tic private enterprises accounted for 42% of sales, 161 foreign-
owned enterprises for 29.5%, and 63 State-owned enterprises for 
28.5% (América Economía, 1997, p. 152). 
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TABLE 1 
Latin America: Ownership of the 100 largest 
industrial enterprises, 1996 
(Number of enterprises) 
State enterprises Domestic private enterprises Foreign enterprises Total 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Chile 
Venezuela 
Total 
17 
18 
7 
2 
2 
3 
49 
23 
17 
8 
2 
0 
0 
50 
40 
35 
15 
4 
2 
4 
100 
Source; Prepared by the authors on the basis of data given in chapter 1 of Peres, 1998. 
TABLE 2 
Type of enterprise 
Domestic private 
Foreign 
State-owned 
Total 
Latin America: Characteristics of the 100 largest 
industrial enterprises, by type of ownership, 1996 
Number of enterprises 
49 
50 
1 
100 
Sales (millions 
of dollars) 
65 898 
93 953 
4000 
163 851 
Average sales per 
enterprise 
(millions of dollars) 
1 345 
1 879 
4 000 
1638 
Breakdown 
of sales 
(percentages) 
40.2 
57.3 
2.5 
100.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data given in chapter 1 of Peres, 1998. 
corporations. On the basis of the information on the 
500 biggest world firms given in Fortune magazine, 
we see that the total sales of the 100 biggest (domes-
tic and foreign-owned) industrial enterprises in Latin 
America in 1996 was less than the income of the 
world's largest corporation (General Motors), which 
came to US$ 168.4 billion in that year.11 The biggest 
private industrial enterprise ever recorded in the re-
gion was a joint venture between Ford and Volk-
swagen (Autolatina) in Brazil, which was dissolved 
in 1994, Even so, this enterprise, with its annual sales 
of almost US$ 10 billion, was only in the last places 
among the biggest world-level enterprises.12 No do-
" Information taken from the web site http:\www. pathfinder. 
comtfortune 500\5001ist.html. 
12
 In order to give this information its due weight it should be 
borne in mind that, as already noted, the phenomenon of con-
glomeration is not fully registered in the sample, and this true 
both of domestic private firms and foreign corporations which 
have large subsidiaries in a number of countries of the region. 
For both types of enterprises, consolidating all their sales would 
qualify them for inclusion among the lower levels of the world's 
largest corporations. 
mestic private industrial enterprise in Latin America 
had sales anywhere near that level in 1996.13 
d) Sectors of activity 
A third feature of BIGS which is worth stressing 
concerns the sectors of activity in which they operate 
and their weight within them. Table 3 gives data for 
1996 on the five biggest enterprises in 19 industrial 
sectors, prepared on the basis of the sample of the 
500 biggest enterprises given in América Economía 
and already referred to earlier. 
The first thing that we see from the table is the 
economic concentration that exists in Latin American 
industry. In the 19 industrial sectors in question, the 
83 (domestic and foreign-owned) enterprises which 
qualify among the five biggest in each sector had 
sales of US$ 122 billion and provided almost 780,000 
jobs in 1996, when the gross value of industrial pro-
13
 In 1996 there were no private non-financial enterprises among 
the seven Latin American companies figuring in the correspond-
ing list (The Economist, 1997, p. 7). 
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TABLE 3 
Sector/enterprise " 
Soft drinks and beer 
Femsac 
Polar0 
Modelo 
Brahma 
Petrochemicals 
Alpek 
Copene 
Cydsac 
Copesul 
Glass 
Vitro c 
Steel 
CSN 
Grupo Acerero del Norte c 
Ispat Mexicana 
Usiminas 
Hylsamex c 
Auto parts 
Desc ¡ 
Robert Bosch 
Unik 
lochpe-Maxion 
Grupo Industrial Saltillo c 
Textiles 
Alpargatas 
Alpargatas Santista 
Grupo Synkro c 
Sâo Paulo Alpargatas 
Agro-Industries 
Cargill 
Molinos Río de la Plata 
Coamo 
Nidera Argentina 
La Plata Cereal 
Cement 
Cemex 
Apasco 
Santa Marina 
Vencemos 
Cebrace 
Pulp and paper 
Papeles y Cartones (CMPC) 
Kimberly-Clark 
Klabin 
Aracruz 
Machinery and equipment 
Condumex 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) 
Empresa Brasileira de 
Compressores (Embraco) 
Caterpillar 
Foodstuffs 
Nestlé 
Sabritas 
Latin America: 
Country 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
: The five 
Ownership 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
F 
DP 
F 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
largest enterprises in 19 Industrial sectors, 1996 
Sales 
(millions 
of dollars) 
2 558.7 
1 700.0 
1 548.4 
1 541.1 
1 546.9 
1 130.7 
861.7 
594.8 
2 317.0 
2 169.7 
1 739.0 
1 650.2 
1 605.8 
1 273.5 
1 576.7 
934.0 
579.7 
466.2 
465.2 
421.3 
416,7 
399,7 
389.7 
1 308.0 
1 215.4 
712,9 
•' 674.5 
631.9 
3 488.7 
525.5 
373.1 
340.0 
331.6 
1 265.0 
1 198.0 
564.7 
536.7 
787.6 
477.7 
410.7 
406.2 
3 591.8 
2 600.0 
Share of 
domestic enter-
prises in sales of 
the five largest 
enterprises 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
80.4 
76.8 
74.1 
71.2 
69.0 
66.4 
57.6 
48.1 
Number 
of workers 
35 937 
18 000 
38 757 
4 858 
5 876 
1017 
10 481 
743 
33 428 
12 532 
23 869 
4 083 
9 210 
7 623 
18 880 
10 829 
9 816 
5 082 
10 285 
2 166 
5 196 
11 777 
1800 
4600 
3 179 
840 
568 
20 527 
2 607 
3 018 
4000 
8 013 
6 337 
2 547 
11 554 
3 006 
6 006 
2 338 
17 150 
Exports 
(millions 
of dollars) 
55.8 
290.7 
400.2 
64.9 
758.0 
579.8 
522.9 
639.5 
333.4 
235.0 
582.6 
266,1 
98.9 
102.9 
-
40.1 
1066.3 
373.8 
386.8 
482.6 
446.3 
125.3 
7.9 
91.5 
-
298.5 
70.5 
490.0 
123.0 
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TABLE 3 (concluded) 
Copersucar 
Bimbo 
Ceval 
Household appliances and 
electronics 
Multibrás 
Xerox 
Itautec Phiico 
Ericsson 
Mabe 
Tobacco 
La Moderna 
Souza Cruz (BAT) 
Massalin (Philip Morris) 
Nobleza Piccardo (BAT) 
Cigatam 
Chemicals 
Celanese 
Basf 
Grupo Irsa 
Bayer 
White Martins Industriáis 
Computer and telephone 
equipment 
IBM 
IBM 
Hewlett-Packard 
NEC do Brasil e 
IBM 
Tyres 
Goodyear 
Pirelli Pneus 
Bridgestone/Firestone 
Tigre 
Aluminium 
CVGC 
Alcoa Aluminio 
Albrás 
Caraiba 
Motor industry 
Volkswagen 
Chrysler 
General Motors 
General Motors (GMB) 
Fiat 
Toiletry and cleaning articles 
Gessy Lever 
Avon 
Procter & Gamble 
Unilever 
Total 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Argentina 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
DP 
DP 
DP 
DP 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
F 
DP 
S 
F 
S 
DP 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
2 033.7 
1 983.2 
1 729.5 
1804.5 
1 630.0 
929.9 
806.8 
772.9 
1 883.9 
1 583.2 
1 455.7 
892.4 
672.4 
1 255.9 
983.9 
757.4 
574.3 
542.6 
1950.0 
1 550.0 
1 141.9 
905.7 
630.0 
835.2 
644.0 
617.0 
358.6 
4 000.0 
1 060.4 
518.1 
492.9 
7 003.3 
6 455.4 
6 345.6 
5 432.9 
4 742.9 
2 748.7 
1 222.3 
1200.0 
796.7 
122 270.5 
46.0 
39.4 
18.4 
14.7 
14.6 
8.1 
0.0 
0.0 
39,8' 
1 107 
55 148 
13 828 
11 101 
6000 
4 887 
2 330 
13 120 
11 249 
8 920 
1 795' 
1 700 
3 446 
6 791 
4 429 
4 472 
2 555 
4 503 
4 039 
1 045 
2 496 
1200 
4 930 
380.8 
735.6 
63.9 
66.1 
30.1 
55.9 
613.5 
107.0 
-
192.5 
136.1 
1 258.3 
365.8 
-
212.4 
132.3 
2 642 
28 000 
8 346 
944 
29 616 
11 066 
91 263 
20 800 
21 359 
9 724 
3 500 
2 800 
779 686 
1 050.0 
. 
4 948.3 
4 526.5 
611.6 
329.9 
41.6 
-
24 791.Í 
Source: Chapter 1 of Peres, 1998. 
" In some sectors fewer than five enterprises are listed because there were not sufficient enterprises in the sample or because some were 
eliminated in order to avoid duplication with holding companies. The individual enterprises in the sectors are ranked according to the 
shares of domestic enterprises in the sales of the five biggest firms; when the shares are equal they are ranked according to their total sales. 
Types of ownership: DP: domestic private; F: foreign private; S: State-owned. 
c
 Corresponds to a holding company; may include activities not related to the sector. 
d
 Property of Cemex. 
e
 Enterprise controlled by Globopar, the holding company of Organizaçôes Globo. 
Average weighted by the sales of the five largest firms. 
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duction in the region was of the order of US$ 750 
billion and the level of industrial employment was 
close to 8.5 million persons.14 Domestic firms had a 
share of 39.8% in the sales of this universe. 
Secondly, the table shows that the sectors where 
big domestic private enterprises had a clearly pre-
dominant share of the sales of the five biggest enter-
prises (over 66% of the total) corresponded to 
traditional activities producing mass-consumption 
goods or basic inputs (non-alcoholic beverages and 
beer, glass, petrochemicals, steel, textiles, agro-indus-
tries, cement, and pulp and paper) and to one metal 
products and machinery industry: the manufacture of 
motor vehicle parts. While the share of domestic en-
terprises in foodstuffs, machinery and equipment,15 
household and electronic appliances and tobacco 
products16 stands at an intermediate level (between 
30% and 66% of the total), they have little or no 
participation in some sectors making intensive use of 
technology and advanced marketing techniques, such 
as automobile production, the manufacture of com-
puter and telephone equipment, tyres, chemical prod-
ucts, and toilet and cleaning articles.17 Although the 
privatization processes opened up some modern areas 
other than the industrial sector to the BlGs -such as 
telecommunications, where they have had to enter 
into associations with big transnational corporations 
in order to cope with the strong competition- they do 
not have an important share in technologically ad-
vanced manufacturing activities at the international 
level.18 
This employment figure does not include micro-enterprises. 
l 5Due fundamentally to the output of Condumex, a Mexican 
company producing electric cables. 
16
 It should be noted that the sale of the two biggest Mexican 
tobacco companies to foreign corporations in 1997 markedly 
reduced the share of domestic enterprises in this sector. 
17
 Their share of the aluminium sector is due to the high level of 
participation of two State-owned enterprises among the four 
biggest firms. 
18
 There are very few cases of the entry of BIGs into high-tech-
nology industries, the most outstanding examples being the in-
vestments of the Pulsar Group (Mexico) in biotechnology and 
some cases of participation (sometimes only transitory) by Bra-
zilian groups in joint ventures for the development of computer 
programmes and equipment or consumer electronic goods, gen-
erally originating while the reserved markets policy was still in 
force (Itautec, Philco, Semp Toshiba, Sharp, NEC, CCE da 
Amazonia, for example). Of the 46 big enterprises analysed indi-
vidually in this study, only one (Sonda, Chile) could be consid-
ered as specializing in a branch of technology typical of the 
present technological revolution (production of computer pro-
grammes). 
The combination of sectoral specialization in rela-
tively homogeneous goods involving large econo-
mies of scale, on the one hand, and sizes of 
enterprises which are small compared with their main 
competitors, on the other, make the BIGs somewhat 
vulnerable in terms of competitiveness, as we shall 
see later. Protectionism allowed some of these sectors 
to devote themselves to the production of goods 
which were practically not tradeable, so that their 
growth was totally determined by that of the domes-
tic market. With the opening up of the region's 
economies, however, these sectors are facing growing 
global competition from world-level competitors who 
are smaller and smaller in number but increasingly 
powerful. As a result, the BIGs have lost the stability 
they previously enjoyed through being leaders in 
these traditional sectors and are facing the strategic 
challenge of either growing or being absorbed by 
big global corporations. 
A third element that emerges from the table is 
the concentration of sectoral leadership in Mexican 
firms, which have the biggest sales in six of the eight 
sectors where domestic enterprises have a share of 
over 50% in the sales of the five biggest firms and 
register the biggest sales in the sector. 
Finally, if we combine the information from ta-
ble 3 and from chapter 1 of Peres (1998), we may 
conclude that there are BIGs where the conglomera-
tion combines sectoral leadership with direct links 
with banks or other financial agents, thus further 
strengthening the advantages in terms of access to the 
capital markets that usually go with a large scale of 
operations.19 However, the financial-industrial link-
age may also offer other forms of more open access 
to these markets, as may be seen from the case of 
highly successful groups which neither own banks 
nor belong to them, one of the most notable examples 
being Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX). 
e) Relations between the domestic market and the 
international economy 
In order to conclude our profile of the BIGs, we 
may refer to the relations they have established be-
tween their domestic markets and the international 
market. As will be analysed in detail below, in 
response to the process of opening-up to external 
In this respect, it is useful to recall the classic works of Leff 
(1976, 1978 and 1979), in which it was argued that the Latin 
American economic groups were a response to the insufficient 
development of the capital markets of the region. 
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competition the BIGS entered the field of non-tradi-
tional exports, in addition to the various strategies 
they used to defend their domestic market segments. 
In this way, they sought to expand their outside mar-
kets within their traditional regional spaces or those 
developed through integration and, in time, in the big 
markets of the industrialized countries too. Table 3 
shows that, of the 41 domestic enterprises which be-
longed in 1996 to the group of the "top five" in 19 
industrial sectors, 37 of them exported part of their 
production, although the sample does not register the 
corresponding amounts in all cases. In the sectors 
where domestic enterprises predominate, the propor-
tion of exports in their total sales is particularly high 
in the case of agro-industries, pulp and paper produc-
tion, steel and glass. If we consider only the 24 do-
mestic enterprises for which export data are recorded, 
the average proportion of exports in the 19 industrial 
sectors is 23.6%. Although this proportion is almost 
double the 13.1% they registered in 1994, it is far 
below that of the foreign-owned enterprises in the 
sample (33.9%): a result which is strongly affected 
by the exports of the motor vehicle manufacturers. 
One group of BlGs -usually the biggest ones-
have internationalized their activities more fully, 
since they not only export goods but also capital, 
making direct investments abroad through the crea-
tion of new enterprises, the acquisition of existing 
firms, mergers or strategic alliances. This internation-
alization takes two forms. 
On the one hand, there is a regional-scope proc-
ess associated with the consolidation of trade integra-
tion, such as the process displayed by the BIGS 
operating in MERCOSUR or in the framework of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In 
the first of these cases, noteworthy examples are the 
investments made in Argentina by the Chilean com-
panies Enersis and Compañía Manufacturera de 
Papeles y Cartones (CMPC) and Brazilian auto parts 
producers such as COFAB. In the second case, the 
most important investments have been those made by 
Vitro (Mexico) in the United States.20 So far, this 
second form has been more frequent. 
20
 The attempts at internationalization by Latin American firms 
have had mixed results. Thus, the purchase of Anchor Glass, the 
biggest glass bottle maker in the United States, by Vitro in 1989 
ended in failure seven years later. The strategic alliances and 
joint ventures have also had varied outcomes, and it is not un-
usual for them to last for only a short time and to be dissolved 
for various reasons. 
On the other hand, a more complex form of in-
ternationalization is that carried out by enterprises 
which set up subsidiaries in various parts of the 
world in a coordinated manner and as part of a com-
mon strategy. These enterprises are seeking to be-
come global players, and they are strongly influenced 
in this by the forms of competition prevailing in their 
industries: this was so in the case of producers of 
cement, soft drinks and beer, among others. The most 
important example in the region is that of CEMEX, 
with its investments in the United States, Spain, Cen-
tral America and South America: indeed, its Mexican 
activities now come under those of its North Ameri-
can division. 
The relative importance of these Latin American 
global enterprises, compared with other similar ven-
tures which have arisen in developing countries, can 
be better appraised with the information from a 1995 
sample of the 50 largest transnational corporations 
originating in developing countries (see UNCTAD, 
1997).21 Among the enterprises studied, 13 were of 
Latin American origin;22 eight were from industrial 
sectors, four from petroleum and mining, and one 
from communications media. Among the eight indus-
trial enterprises, five were Mexican, two were Brazil-
ian, and one was Chilean. 
Among the six largest Latin America enterprises, 
only one was industrial (CEMEX). Moreover, although 
this was the second largest industrial enterprise ac-
cording to the value of its assets abroad, it only came 
in 26th place in the ranking by total sales, since 
CEMEX'S sales were less than 10% of those of the 
biggest industrial group in the sample (Daewoo), 
which came to over US$ 26 billion. 
This information highlights once again the speciali-
zation of Latin American enterprises in areas closely 
linked with processed natural resources, in contrast with 
the concentration of the East Asian countries on activi-
ties such as the manufacture of electronic goods. At 
the same time, however, in spite of the limitations of 
this type of information it may be noted that, in terms 
of the index of transnationalization,23 the enterprises 
of the region have a similar average (32%) to that of 
the Asian countries, excluding China. 
1
 The sample has limitations of coverage, so that the data from 
it should only be used indicatively. 
22
 Similar data for 1993 registered the presence of 17 such Latin 
American enterprises (UNCTAD, 1995). 
23
 The index of transnationalization is calculated as the average 
ratio of foreign assets to total assets, of foreign sales to total sales, 
and of employment abroad to total employment (UNCTAD, 1997). 
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2. Business dynamics 
The BIGS have had to face various situations of 
change in the course of their history. Two past events 
were particularly important: i) the introduction of ex-
plicit import substitution industrialization policies in 
the 1930s, with their consequent impact on the dy-
namics of organizations which had arisen in the con-
text of the agricultural or mining export model of 
previous decades, and ii) the exhaustion of those poli-
cies and the onset of the external debt crisis in the 
early 1980s. Today, they are going through an 
equally important period in which they are seeking to 
adjust to a less protectionist economic order, with 
strong competition in the goods and capital markets, 
in the midst of a technological revolution which ap-
pears to be speeding up still further. 
The analysis of the present adjustment may be 
organized into three levels: i) the changes in the 
shares of the BIGS in the universe of big enterprises of 
the region; ii) the changes which have been taking 
place at the industrial enterprise and plant level, and 
iii) the dynamics of the general strategy of the groups 
to which these enterprises belong. 
a) Changes in the shares of domestic enterprises in 
the universe of big enterprises 
The available aggregated information shows that 
the big domestic enterprises have increased in size 
but have lost relative weight in the universe of (do-
mestic and foreign-owned) large private industrial 
enterprises, subject to some reservations which will 
be explained later. This has been the result of the 
interaction of two important processes which have 
taken place in Latin America as a consequence of the 
structural reforms. The first was the privatization of 
State enterprises in the course of the 1980s and 
1990s, which has led to their virtual disappearance 
from the universe of big manufacturing enterprises in 
the region. The other was the growing presence of 
subsidiaries of foreign enterprises as a result of de-
regulation, easing of the rules limiting their presence 
in some specific sectors, and the policy measures 
taken in order to attract foreign capital, in spite of the 
active role that domestic enterprises played in the pri-
vatization process and in the defence of their local 
markets and expansion of their exports, they were not 
able to prevent the big increase in the presence of 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations. 
The increase in size may be seen from table 4, 
which shows that the domestic enterprises in the uni-
verse of the 100 largest industrial enterprises of Latin 
America increased their annual sales from an average 
of US$ 827 million in 1990 to US$ 1,345 million in 
1996.24 In spite of this effort, however, they grew 
more slowly than foreign enterprises, which in-
creased their average size from US$ 1,075 million to 
US$ 1,879 million over the same period. This table 
also shows that the share .of domestic private enter-
prises in the sales of the 100 largest industrial enter-
prises went down from 45.9% to 40.2% between 
1990 and 1996, while the share of State-owned enter-
prises went down to less than one-third of its initial 
level but that of the subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions grew significantly to 57.3% of the total. It must 
be borne in mind, however, that the enterprises of a 
single industrial sector -motor vehicle assembly- ac-
counted for 30 percentage points of the share of 
foreign enterprises both in 1996 and in 1994 (in 1990 
they accounted for 22.1%). Thus, 8 of the 11 percent-
age points by which foreign firms increased their 
participation was due to the outstanding performance 
of that sector in the countries studied (Mortimore, 
1997), and almost the whole of this increase occurred 
between 1990 and 1994. 
Leaving aside what happened in the motor indus-
try, however, the information in table 4 also points to 
other elements, since it shows that much of the de-
cline in the share of domestic enterprises in the uni-
verse of the 100 biggest enterprises took place as 
from 1994, while the foreign enterprises operating in 
sectors other than the motor industry increased their 
share by almost four percentage points. The 1995 
Mexican crisis and its negative impact on the other 
economies of the region (the "tequila effect") could 
mark a turning point in this respect.25 Not only may it 
be inferred that the lower propensity to export of the 
domestic enterprises compared with the foreign en-
terprises had a more adverse effect on them m view 
of the decline in the domestic market, but also that 
the information contained in the country studies pre-
sented in Peres (1998) shows the importance of the 
purchases of domestic firms by foreign corporations 
In the context of slow economic growth which marked the 
period in question, this increase in size suggests that the loss of 
the static rents which they enjoyed from protection was more 
than offset by their exploitation of the wider market provided 
through trade openness. 
25
 In particular, the share of Mexican enterprises in the sample 
of the 100 biggest enterprises went down from 22.0% in 1994 to 
19.5% in 1996. 
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TABLE4 
Latin America: Evolution of the 100 
largest industrial enterprises, 1990,1994 and 1996 
Enterprises 1990 1994 1996 
Domestic private 
Foreign 
State-owned 
Total 
Domestic private 
Foreign 
State-owned 
Total 
Domestic private 
Foreign 
State-owned 
Total 
Shares in the sales of the 100 largest 
industrial enterprises (%) 
Domestic private 
Foreign 
Motor industry 
Others 
State-owned 
Total 
52 
40 
8 
100 
43 011 
43 009 
7 688 
93 708 
827 
1075 
961 
937 
45.9 
45.9 
(22.1) 
(23.8) 
8.2 
100.0 
Number of enterprises 
55 
44 
1 
100 
Sales (millions of dollars) 
68 269 
80 991 
2 757 
152 017 
Average sales (millions of dollars) 
1 241 
1 841 
2 757 
1 520 
44.9 
53.3 
(30.0) 
(23.3) 
1.8 
100.0 
49 
50 
1 
100 
65 898 
93 953 
4000 
163 851 
1 345 
1 879 
4000 
1 638 
40.2 
57.3 
(30.2) 
(27.1) 
2.5 
100.0 
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from América Economía (1993,1996 and 1997). 
as from 1995. Outstanding in this respect, in the 
countries hardest hit by the "tequila effect", was the 
sale of stock holdings giving total or partial control 
of enterprises in the food industry in Argentina and in 
the beer and tobacco products industries in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, however, industrial enterprises 
have also been sold out to foreign investors in coun-
tries, such as Chile, where the "tequila effect" was 
practically nil. In these cases, the foreign investors' 
interest in occupying positions in the markets of 
those countries by purchasing existing companies 
may be due to the maturity of the globalization po-
tential of the production sectors in question and the 
expansion of markets as a result of subregional inte-
gration in Latin America. This is shown by the fact 
that although some purchases involved enterprises 
with production or financial problems, such as the 
Brazilian automobile parts manufacturer Metal Leve, 
many of them corresponded to successful companies 
such as the electric power holding company Enersis 
in Chile or the three main Brazilian household appli-
ance manufacturers, which were acquired by big tran-
snational corporations between 1995 and 1997 (The 
Economist, 1997). 
b) Changes at the plant or enterprise level 
At this level, the main changes have been in 
organizational, commercial and financial functions, 
the situation being more heterogeneous at the produc-
tion and technological levels. Forms of business or-
ganization have tended to reduce the number of 
levels of authority, leading to a less vertical structure, 
and have concentrated activities in business centres 
or units, markedly increasing the professional nature 
of management: a modernization process which 
has coincided in some cases with a change of genera-
tion in family-controlled businesses. Within this con-
text, commercial functions and financial engineering 
continue to be the strongest areas of management. 
With regard to marketing, there have been sub-
stantial changes in relations with clients and suppli-
ers of services or inputs. The strengthening of a 
client-oriented approach (or an approach oriented to-
wards the consumers or users of intermediate prod-
ucts) has made it possible in some cases to stand up 
to competition from imported goods. In other cases, it 
has been necessary to combine this approach with the 
importation of finished or intermediate goods in or-
der to complete the product lines offered to clients 
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and distributed through strong marketing channels set 
up during the import substitution industrialization era.26 
While the relations with clients (especially end-
users) and suppliers of production services have sig-
nificantly improved as a result of the efforts to keep 
domestic customer loyalty and reduce operating 
costs, relations with suppliers of tradeable inputs pre-
sent a more varied picture. The pressure from imports 
has made itself felt particularly in the replacement of 
domestic suppliers by those from abroad: a strategy 
which has been accompanied by the importation of 
finished goods for sale on the domestic market. In 
both cases, this has reduced the demand for domestic 
inputs: a phenomenon which has been matched, for 
similar reasons, by a much less highly developed do-
mestic supply of capital goods. However, there have 
been extensive programmes to develop suppliers for 
some assembly industries, such as the assembly of 
computer equipment at Guadalajara (Mexico), or the 
automobile parts industries at Bahía (Brazil) and Cór-
doba (Argentina). 
Traditional comparative advantages,27 accumu-
lated capacities and macroeconomic policy seem to 
be the variables that determine the selection of one or 
the other of these approaches. Everything seems to 
indicate, at least in the short term, that the tendency 
towards an increase in the relative importance of im-
ports of inputs and capital goods will predominate, 
except at times of macroeconomic adjustment with 
recession and abrupt devaluation of the exchange 
rate. This has led to the weakening of many local 
production chains and has reduced the options open 
to small and medium-sized supplier firms, as explic-
itly acknowledged, for example, in the Industrial 
Policy and External Trade Programme adopted by 
Mexico in 1996 (Peres, 1997). 
This has been so in the case of automobile assembly firms 
(such as Fiat in Brazil or the Compañía Colombiana Automotriz 
(CCA) and the Sociedad de Fabricación de Automotores (SOFASA) 
in Colombia), household appliance manufacturers (such as the 
Industria Colombiana de Electrónica y Electrodomésticos 
(INCELT) in Colombia or the Compañía Tecno Industrial (CTI) in 
Chile), and even steel and petrochemicals enterprises such as 
Acerías de Colombia (Acesco) and Poliolefinas Colombianas 
(Policolsa). 
27
 The strength of the systems of suppliers for the big agro-food 
groups in Brazil (Perdigâo and Sadia), Argentina (Moreno, 
Urquía, Bunge y Born) and Chile (Industria Azucarera Nacional 
- IANSA) shows the importance of the comparative advantages 
base for promoting non-voluntaristic supplier development pro-
grammes. The limited competitiveness of the Colombian suppli-
ers of barley for the Bavaria beer company shows the same thing 
in the opposite sense. 
The product mix manufactured or marketed by 
firms has also changed, although not always in 
the same direction. While textile companies such as 
Fabricato and Coltejer in Colombia and Sào Paulo 
Alpargatas in Brazil have reduced their range of 
products, other types of companies have expanded it, 
as in the case of WEG Motores, Oxiteno (chemicals) 
and USIMINAS (iron and steel) in Brazil. Although 
there have also been some cases of expansion of the 
product mix of some Chilean companies (MADECO, 
for example), it would appear that the Brazilian 
companies mentioned have moved in this direction 
because of the size of their domestic market and 
the possibility of combining economies of scale 
and scope. 
Even in the cases where companies expand their 
range of products, the tendency to subcontract with 
third parties to carry out secondary activities is a gen-
eralized response to the greater competition. Some-
times this subcontracting is accompanied by greater 
vertical integration of the industrial group itself, as 
we shall see below. 
The strengthening of financial engineering in the 
big enterprises has allowed the BIGs to consolidate 
their access to short- and long-term international 
capital markets, their most notable operations being 
the issue of ADRs on the New York market. In a few 
cases, access to the capital markets has meant the 
complete opening-up of the firm's equity, but as al-
ready noted, family control continues to predominate. 
The production and technological development 
functions of the enterprises have not generally devel-
oped as much as the marketing and financial func-
tions. Among the enterprises of the three countries 
which were studied in detail, those of Brazil show the 
greatest interest and capacity in these areas, which is 
also consistent with other indicators, such as the 
number of ISO 9000 certifications obtained. Market 
size and the relative maturity of the existing capaci-
ties seem to be the main factors behind this better 
performance, especially with regard to product de-
sign, exploitation of brand names and quality man-
agement (Bonelli, 1997), effectively supported in 
some cases by public policy.28 
8
 The progress made in Brazil in the area of "soft" technologies 
is generally attributed to the success of the Brazilian Quality and 
Productivity Programme applied since 1990, 
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In the other countries, advances in production 
and technology are relatively less marked.29 The main 
achievements in terms of increases in average labour 
productivity at the sectoral level -which were note-
worthy in the first half of the 1990s even after de-
ducting the effect of the economic cycle (Katz, 
Benavente, Crespi and Stumpo, 1997)- are mainly 
attributable to reductions in the number of persons 
employed, as a result of the subcontracting of secon-
dary activities; more flexible working processes, and 
the incorporation of some elements of new manage-
ment techniques. However, the individual country 
studies show that there were also substantial invest-
ments in the modernization of the plant and equip-
ment of the big firms in some mature import 
substitution industrialization industries, such as the 
production of iron and steel in Argentina, sugar in 
Chile, beer in Colombia and cement in Mexico. The 
BIGS' abundant access to finance facilitated this re-
sponse to the increased competition due to trade 
openness, in contrast with the position of smaller 
firms. 
The different relative weights of the various 
management functions depend on supply and demand 
factors. The crisis of the 1980s caused the top man-
agement to centre their attention on marketing and 
finances, since the problems which they perceived to 
be most acute were the fall in sales and the inability 
of their firms to meet their financial obligations. In 
due course, this demand gave rise to a supply of 
highly qualified professionals in these areas. Matters 
of production and technology were relegated to the 
background: an approach which was often strength-
ened by the importation of capital goods requiring 
little or no adaptation, which increased considerably 
with the economic recovery of the early 1990s. 
c) Growth strategies 
The changes which have taken place in the 
strategies of the BIGS may be grouped in various 
ways, but in general they tended to be centered on the 
triad of withdrawal, defensive and offensive strate-
29
 Even in the case of Chile, the relevant chapter of Peres (1998) 
notes that although that country occupied ninth place in the 
"business management" ranking of the 48 countries listed in 
1996 in the World Competitiveness Report (HMD, 1996), it 
dropped to 27th place when the "science and technology" factor 
was included. 
gies,30 although the first two of these imply, in the 
long term, the cessation of activities or loss of control 
of the firm by its original owners. In all cases, the 
strategies could be either a reaction to outside pres-
sures (reactive strategies) or they could be basically 
proactive. 
The universe of BIGS displays all three of these 
types of strategies, although, because of their size, the 
examples of withdrawal tend to be concentrated in 
the category involving the sale of the whole enter-
prise or a controlling interest to foreign investors, 
rather than its closure; examples of this are the Astra 
petroleum group in Argentina, the COFAP auto parts 
firm in Brazil, and the two big cigarette manufactur-
ers in Mexico: Cigarros La Tabacalera Mexicana 
(CIGATAM) and La Moderna. 
Defence of the domestic market has taken differ-
ent forms, the most important ones being preventive 
investments (especially in the two biggest economies); 
the importation of finished products for sale on the 
domestic market, taking advantage of local distribu-
tion networks; greater and more intensive orientation 
of activities towards the client (especially noteworthy 
in the food industries); the formation of combined 
industrial and financial groups, in countries where 
this is permitted by law;31 and rent-seeking through 
access to fiscal, trade or sectoral promotion benefits. 
Although these latter benefits are less prevalent than 
in the past, they are still far from having disappeared 
completely, as shown by the examples of the motor 
industry in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, forestry in 
Chile, or the support given to various industrial sec-
tors in Colombia. 
30
 Naturally, defensive strategies do not make much sense in the 
long run. In the face of greater competition and ongoing techno-
logical change, a defensive strategy can only be a stage on the 
way to withdrawal or to an offensive strategy. Experience also 
shows that there is no need for a preliminary defensive stage, since 
many of the biggest firms have followed an offensive strategy ever 
since the beginning of the external debt crisis. Restructuring of 
assets (mergers and acquisitions), investments abroad and closer 
links with the financial sector developed throughout the 1980s, 
although they were combined with strategies to defend the do-
mestic market share when trade openness began to be applied. 
31
 Among the countries studied, Chile displays the lowest degree 
of formal linkages between banking and industry, because of the 
experience of the crisis of the early 1980s, although some of its 
industrial groups do have clear links with banks. Also, both in 
Chile and Brazil there is growing participation by pension funds 
(private, in the case of Chile; belonging to big State enterprises, 
in-the case of Brazil) in the equity of the biggest enterprises. 
This could open up new ways of promoting finance-based con-
glomeration, 
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One form of defensive strategy which has been 
used (although it involves new diversified invest-
ments) is the shift from industrial activities to mod-
ern non-tradeable services. The tendency to move out 
of industrial sectors is the result of signals coming 
from the trade openness process and macroeconomic 
policies which maintain an overvalued national cur-
rency that adversely affects the profitability of the 
tradeable goods sectors. The possibility and desirabil-
ity of investing in non-tradeable services has also 
been furthered by the deregulation of some markets 
or the privileged access that some groups have had, 
or hope to have, to the privatization of telecommuni-
cations, electricity distribution, and the infrastructure 
in general. In many cases, as seems clear in Colom-
bia, this approach has led groups to use their big 
industrial enterprises as a source of financial re-
sources for taking part in privatization operations or 
deregulated markets, while putting off or minimizing 
their investments in the modernization of production 
activities. 
In this sense, one might wonder to what extent 
the structural reforms have done away with the rent-
seeking behaviour of major sectors of the business 
world, since although some markets for non-
tradeable services are hotly disputed between strong 
competitors, the conditions of that competition and, 
hence, the final profitability of the activities in 
question, depend on State regulations and the differ-
ential access of the competitors to the market. 
Offensive strategies are more complex, and at 
least three different types may be distinguished: 
i) Growth with increasing specialization around 
the basic core business, as in the case of some BlGs 
strongly centered around the processing of natural re-
sources, such as Bunge y Born and Pérez Companc in 
Argentina, Klabin in Brazil or Alfa in Mexico. This 
category also includes BlGs which have not in-
creased their degree of specialization because it was 
already very high, such as CEMEX in Mexico and the 
Matte Group in Chile. 
ii) Growth with moderately increased diversifi-
cation, possibly combining de-verticalization at the 
level of individual enterprises with an increase in 
vertical or horizontal integration at the level of the 
group as a whole, as a result of participation in a 
few privatization operations, mergers, or acquisition 
of other private companies. In all cases, the basic 
criterion for engaging in this type of operations is 
the achievement of potential synergies. Techint and 
Pescarmona in Argentina, Angelini in Chile, Suzano 
and Votorantim in Brazil, Santo Domingo (Bavaria) 
in Colombia and Pulsar in Mexico are examples of 
this type of moderate strategy. 
iii) Growth with extreme diversification, largely 
as a result of participation in numerous privatization 
operations. These cases, which give rise to true con-
glomerates without any clear production, commercial 
or even financial synergies, are often due to the adop-
tion of portfolio-based criteria. The most notable ex-
amples are the Sociedad Comercial del Plata (energy, 
construction, services) in Argentina, Vicunha (textiles, 
iron and steel, mining) in Brazil, and Carso (tele-
phone services, electric cables, tyres, restaurants) in 
Mexico. These conglomerates cover extremely dis-
similar activities and their great relatively recent de-
velopment is based on close links with the international 
capital market, the main domestic banks, and the 
decision-making circles at the political level of priva-
tization operations. Naturally, the expected gains and 
the financial risks are both high. 
In each particular case, the strategies adopted de-
pend on a complex set of factors. The sectoral factor 
is generally important at three levels: i) the different 
competitiveness of each sector and hence its capacity 
to compete with imports in a context of trade open-
ness; ii) its different degree of maturity, due to its 
particular learning curve and degree of progress; and 
iii) the relevant promotional policy packages, which, 
although often not openly acknowledged, have been 
important in almost all countries (petrochemicals in 
Argentina, forestry in Chile, and the motor industry 
in Mexico and Brazil are some notable examples). 
The sectoral factor alone is not sufficient to explain 
the business strategy adopted, however, as is shown 
by the studies of pairs of BlGs located in the same 
sectors in Brazil (Peres, 1998). 
Thus, the iron and steel groups (Gerdau and 
Belgo-Mineira) took different approaches to buy-outs 
and privatization operations. Although Klabin and 
Suzano compete in the pulp and paper market, the 
former sought to specialize, while the latter showed 
more interest in moderate diversification. Finally, 
there could hardly be a greater contrast than in the 
case of the textile groups, since whereas Alpargatas 
took a basically defensive strategy, Vicunha (which 
was based on very strong financial support) ended up 
as a major participant in the Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional and in the mining giant Companhia do Vale 
do Rio Doce. 
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The caution or boldness of the business leader-
ship, though difficult to define, are important factors 
in explaining the final adoption of a strategy. These 
differences in management styles, which are rela-
tively independent of the systemic determinants, 
would also explain the different preferences of the 
groups with regard to privatization operations, rang-
ing from little or no participation to an overwhelming 
presence both in the home country and abroad. Natu-
rally, the style of management and the quest for eco-
nomic power are often inseparable in operational 
terms. Beyond these differences, however, an ele-
ment which is shared by the different strategic op-
tions is the growing weight of the external market, 
whether in exports or in imports, and whether it is a 
The current profile of the BIGS is itself a proof that a 
significant number of them have made a positive shift 
within the framework of the structural changes that 
have taken place over the last decade. The results are 
still limited and changing, however, because this 
class of enterprises, together with the sectors and the 
economies in which they operate, are still in a state of 
change, subject as they are to internal tensions and 
the pressure of international competition. 
The present situation of the BIGS reflects suc-
cesses in consolidating their growth paths, success-
fully coping with the dynamics of the industries in 
which they operate, and taking advantage of the sup-
port offered by public policies. However, they are 
faced with challenges due to the limits imposed by 
their sectoral specialization and the contradictory sig-
nals emerging from the interaction of the structural 
reforms and the macroeconomic policies which have 
accompanied them. 
1. The limits of sectoral specialization 
In the long term, the continued presence of BIGS in 
product lines that are not drawing closer to those reg-
istering high growth rates in the world market sug-
gests that they may eventually run out of further 
growth possibilities. Although in the short term some 
traditional product lines have registered strong 
question of receiving or of making foreign invest-
ments. 
In short, the growth of the successful BIGS has 
not been merely the result of repeating a tried recipe. 
On the contrary, in order to develop in the product 
lines in which they already had experience they have 
had to make big changes in their organization, mar-
keting techniques and finances, as well as invest-
ments in new plants and modern equipment. Even so, 
some of the elements analysed in the following sec-
tion suggest that staying within their traditional prod-
uct lines may restrict their long-term gifowth, so that 
in the future they will probably have to face up to the 
need to shift their growth paths towards more dy-
namic sectors. 
growth which has served as the basis for the growth 
strategies of such enterprises, this has been influ-
enced by elements which may not always favour their 
growth in the long term,32 if the most dynamic inter-
national trade flows continue to be concentrated in 
the products of the electronics and advanced engi-
neering industries and natural resources continue to 
lose ground (Mortimore, 1995).33 
The expansion of BIGS through their traditional 
product lines regularly leads us to discover that, in 
order to keep up their growth, they must expand their 
markets abroad. In order to do this, they must con-
front big transnational corporations which are not 
only competing in the same world markets but are 
also trying to take over the domestic markets of the 
Si
 As shown by the vegetable oils, forestry, fishery, mining and 
other industries, the increased output of these goods has been 
based mainly on strong expansion of their production frontier 
through investments in physical facilities and know-how. There 
are no generally accepted forecasts, however, regarding the 
possibility of maintaining in the long term the growth rate that 
this frontier has displayed in recent decades, even if demand 
for such goods continues to grow, 
33
 Although it could be argued that it is not possible to draw a 
distinction between good and bad types of sectoral specializa-
tion, differences in the income-elasticity of world demand, 
returns to scale and learning paths make it doubtful whether all 
sectors are equally good for the long-term growth of an econ-
omy. See, in this respect, Cohen and Zysman (1987). 
IV 
Challenges and policy responses 
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BIGS. They are therefore faced with the following 
dilemma: whether to make changes in their strategies, 
forms of organization and production, finance, mar-
keting and world market position in order to take on 
the global competition, or whether, on the contrary, to 
try to improve their current position in order to in-
crease the value of their enterprises so as to sell them 
to their foreign competitors for the best possible 
price, taking advantage of the possible temporary 
over-valuation of their countries' national currency. 
The first of these options requires extraordinary 
financial, technological and marketing resources, 
whereas the second option is increasingly frequent in 
the region, giving rise to growing foreign takeovers 
of the most dynamic segments of local industry.34 The 
relatively small size of the BIGS compared with the 
world leaders and even with similar enterprises of 
some East Asian countries makes them an easy prey 
for hostile takeovers once their national or regional 
markets become attractive. 
The option of selling the company opens up a 
series of opposing alternatives for the owners of the 
big Latin American companies. On the one hand, the 
sale may convert them into mere portfolio investors, 
but on the other, the liquid capital thus obtained may 
help them to move into new areas of investment. 
These moves follow two different rationales. In some 
cases, as already noted, the money obtained is in-
vested in the production of non-tradeable goods and 
services (public utilities, privatized firms enjoying 
special protection regimes, etc.), in the expectation of 
preserving niches protected from foreign competi-
tion. On the other hand, however -particularly when 
the vendor possesses other enterprises with "specific 
secondary assets"- this may lay the foundations for a 
new long-term expansion path.35 
34
 Although foreign takeovers are not a problem in themselves, 
they make it more difficult to apply policies based on consensus-
seeking between the public and private actors, as is increasingly 
the practice in Latin American countries (Peres, 1997). Accep-
tance of the explicit participation of external agents in the de-
sign and implementation of public policies would mean major 
changes in the political and cultural framework of most of the 
countries of the region. 
35
 An example of this is the Pulsar group in Mexico, which sold 
its tobacco company La Moderna to the British-American 
Tobacco Company (BAT) for US$ 1.7 billion in order to obtain 
resources to strengthen its biotechnology seed company, which 
is only small but is a world leader in its sector and will, it is 
hoped, be the basis for the group's development in the areas of 
agro-industry and forestry. 
2. The impact of the structural reforms 
The structural reforms sought to create a new pattern 
of competition, more open to the exterior and with 
less State intervention. In general, after a first period 
of relative moderation and gradualism, they became 
more intensive and even, in some countries, quite 
radical. In this context, the BlGs, which had been the 
great beneficiaries of the import substitution industri-
alization model, were seen in theory as obstacles to 
the establishment of a system of free competition, in 
view of their domination of important oligopolistic 
markets. In actual fact, however, the form taken by 
the structural reforms and explicit promotion meas-
ures gave rise to an economic order which was highly 
favourable to the development of the BlGs. 
In addition to direct support through fiscal subsi-
dies for some of the activities in question, four types 
of policies played an important role in this respect: 
i) Privileged access to the main privatization op-
erations, which were hardly ever carried out under 
free market conditions. In particular, the bodies re-
sponsible for the privatization were allowed to select 
the future groups that would control the privatized 
enterprises and to embody highly discriminatory con-
ditions of access and future operation in the tendering 
rules. Indeed, there are indications that in some cases 
members of the privatization bodies or even of higher 
political levels were actors and beneficiaries in the 
tendering process. 
ii) The international trade negotiations for the 
formation of free trade areas, as was perfectly desir-
able, gave the private sector an important role in par-
ticipating in or advising on the definition of 
production sectors or policy practices which were 
particularly sensitive matters for each country, where 
greater openness could represent either a threat or an 
opportunity. However, the natural heterogeneity of 
the private sector meant that this participation was 
controlled in effect by the BlGs or the chambers of 
industry in which the BlGs played a decisive role. 
iii) The implementation of the legislation de-
signed to strengthen free competition through de-
regulation tended to maintain the status quo as 
regards the concentration of the various industrial 
branches, on the perfectly correct grounds that in 
open economies market power is not determined by 
the existence of a concentrated industrial structure. 
The view that the right thing to do was to avoid any 
actions militating against competition rather than to 
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obviate concentrated structures was functional in 
maintaining the BIGS' shares in their key markets. 
iv) Some promotional programmes aimed at 
non-industrial sectors also had a positive impact on 
the BlGs, especially in Mexico, where the demand 
generated by big highway and housing construction 
projects aided civil engineering enterprises such as 
ICA and producers of cement and flat glass (CEMEX 
and Vitro), which were important components in the 
main Mexican groups. The greater economic weight 
achieved by the big civil engineering and heavy engi-
neering enterprises (empreiteiras) in Brazil was also 
due to this rationale. 
In short, the new economic order operated in 
such a way that although the BIGS were oligopolies 
which had mostly arisen in the conditions of protec-
tion established under the import substitution indus-
trialization process, it was nevertheless highly 
functional for their growth. 
The studies included in Peres (1998) show that 
these groups have indeed been able to process the 
signals given by the new economic order in an effec-
tive manner. However, some incoherencies in those 
signals have hindered the materialization of the re-
sults which were expected from an export-led form of 
development which could link up efficiently with the 
rest of the industrial structure, and not just the lead-
ers. 
On the one hand, external openness has meant 
macroeconomic policies determined by the availabil-
ity of the short-term international capital which is a 
key factor in financing the deficit that accompanies 
such openness. In this context, the free movement of 
capital and the over-valuation of the local currencies 
caused by the high real interest rates in dollars, the 
contraction in public expenditure and the contain-
ment of real wages are the "anchors" of the macroe-
conomic balances, especially price stability. 
The result of this is that the signals emitted by 
the macroeconomic environment are contradictory, 
because although there is stability in the short term, 
the conditions in which this stability is achieved give 
rise to uncertainty, financial speculation and an in-
crease in the expectations of future instability.36 Thus, 
36
 A further factor which complicates this situation is that some 
of the key factors governing short-term capital flows are not 
under the control of national governments, as was shown by the 
crises in Mexico (1994) and Thailand (1997). 
the key variables of macroeconomic policy tend to 
weaken what should be the core of a new growth 
model: efficient international linkages through ex-
ports, especially of products with growing local 
added value. The ambiguous and confused signals 
transmitted by the main macroeconomic variables fa-
vour and continually increase the emphasis placed by 
enterprises on short-term considerations, which is un-
favourable for a really sound restructuring process 
and for long-term competitiveness. 
At the same time, the signals emitted by the 
structural reforms were insufficient. As noted earlier, 
these reforms -in spite of the importance they as-
signed to competition among the private actors- did 
not take due account of the actual problems of enter-
prises. On the contrary, the reform strategies made 
the structure of relative prices determined in free 
markets the key variable for giving the economic 
agents the information they needed in order to take 
their consumption and production decisions and, 
hence, ensuring that the economy would follow a 
path of sustained growth. 
In these strategies, no attention was given to the 
design of policies to facilitate changes by entrepre-
neurs in response to the reforms. On the contrary, it 
was considered that the State should facilitate faster 
and more radical business adjustments by refraining 
from direct intervention and allowing the application 
of what was known at the time as "shock therapy", 
which was supposed to minimize the costs of change 
and establish suitable conditions for enterprises to 
promote sounder growth of the economy on the basis 
of the market rationale. 
The failure to take account of the differences be-
tween individual enterprises and the many factors de-
termining their behaviour suggests that the reforms 
were implicitly based on the idea of a form of compe-
tition determined by the relative power of the enter-
prises concerned, in which the biggest enterprises 
would in principle be in a privileged position to adapt 
to the macroeconomic and sectoral changes. Conse-
quently, it may be asserted that an important compo-
nent in the reforms was an ideological discourse (in 
the positive sense of the term) aimed at promoting the 
restructuring of the BIGS and their assumption of a 
new but still predominant position in the new na-
tional and international conditions. 
In keeping with this approach, the first stage of 
the reforms generally rejected active industrial poli-
cies and any financial, technological or organiza-
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tional strategy aimed at systematically promoting the 
restructuring and re-articulation of the various seg-
ments and sectors of activity towards a new type of 
organization of production capable of generating a 
dynamic of systemic competitiveness. In the second 
stage, in the mid-1990s, there has been a marked re-
covery of interest by the governments of the region in 
developing industrial competitiveness policies, al-
though their political will and capacity for action in 
this respect are still weak (Peres, 1997). All this has 
limited the attempts to create business strategies that 
seek new paths for the expansion of production. 
3. The issues in the policy debate 
Together, the contradictory conditions within which 
the changes in the enterprises interact with the "selec-
tion environments" formed by the production patterns 
and the public policy contexts mean that the proc-
esses of change are taking place in an unstable man-
ner, even for the successful BIGS, and involve costs, 
risks and delays for the economies where they oper-
ate. This is because these processes are not helping to 
generate a new economic fabric which is clearly vi-
able in the long term. Everything suggests that it is 
necessary to reconsider some elements of the funda-
mental conception of the structural reforms if it is 
desired to achieve the progressive linking up of 
changes in enterprises, in the production pattern and 
in public policies in order to follow an efficient de-
velopment path under the new international condi-
tions. In this context, there are four policy areas 
which merit special attention, since they will form 
part of the future debate in the region: 
i) The linkages between the financial and indus-
trial sectors are the first area of unsolved problems, in 
spite of the different solutions that have been tried, 
ranging from de facto recognition of the operation 
of financial-industrial groups to the total separation 
of these two sectors for reasons of banking safety 
and prudence. In the first case, however, it has not 
been possible to obviate opportunistic or downright 
corrupt behaviour, with its consequent costs in terms 
of public confidence and expenditure, while in the 
second case there are obvious difficulties in inducing 
the banking system to progress in the financing of 
production activities related with the development 
of new sectors and technologies. 
Ü) The relative size of the BlGs is a second area 
of unsolved problems. Although, on the one hand, 
large size and growth may endanger free competition 
and increase structural heterogeneity, on the other 
hand most of the BIGS are too small by international 
standards to have much chance of succeeding against 
the great world-level oligopolistic industries. More-
over, this relatively small size has made them vulner-
able to buy-outs by foreign investors from both inside 
and outside the region. Although this might not be 
very important or might even be positive in terms of 
the growth and technical progress of the enterprises, 
it raises problems when trying to design concerted 
policies, because of the difficulty of openly including 
outside agents in the processes of negotiation and im-
plementation of domestic policies, to say nothing of 
the strictly political dimension of the loss of national 
control over still more leading agents of develop-
ment. 
iii) We have seen throughout this article that 
openness, trade integration, accumulated capacities 
and the sectoral dimension are the main determinants 
of business strategies. With regard to the first two 
elements, the countries of the region have already 
adopted clear and in some cases irreversible posi-
tions, although some important decisions regarding 
timing and tempos are still outstanding. There is still 
a lack of decision at the sectoral level, however, and 
there is a lack of will to commit the necessary re-
sources for the formation of competitive capacity. 
The lack of decision on how to act at the sectoral 
level in a context of markedly reduced protection 
may persist for a long time, and it may be that only 
isolated actions will be taken to meet needs associ-
ated with competition for foreign investments, the 
rescue of some sectors which are in crisis and, in the 
biggest countries, efforts to deconcentrate economic 
activity. However, there is no reason or valid excuse 
not to advance in the implementation of the many 
competitiveness policies designed in recent times in 
the region (Peres, 1997). 
iv) Increasing the linkages of the BIGS with the 
rest of the enterprises is perhaps the most important 
problem to be solved in order to ensure stable long-
term development. Although the progress made has 
been only modest and there are even some cases of 
serious setbacks, the tendency towards the delinking 
of secondary activities will continue to be strongly 
pursued in the process of seeking greater competi-
tiveness. The first reaction has been to use imports as 
a source of inputs and capital goods, but the pursuit 
of competitive advantages may cause attention to be 
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directed to (he possible comparative advantages of 
domestic small and medium-sized enterprises as sup-
pliers of parts, components and services for produc-
tion activities. The same political will that could 
boost the implementation of the competitiveness poli-
cies referred to earlier is very necessary in this area 
too. However, this political will is subject to the lim-
its imposed by the specialization of the BIGS in sec-
tors processing natural resources, where it is difficult 
to develop such long subcontracting chains -that is to 
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